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SO: This is Sue Onslow talking to Mr Bill Kirkman at Wolfson College, 
Cambridge on Wednesday 16th January 2013. Bill, thank you very much 
indeed for agreeing to talk to me for this project. You were, of course, 
Commonwealth Staff and Africa Correspondent at The Times in the 
1960s and also did frequent broadcasts on the BBC World Service and 
for its Africa Service in that decade. I wonder if you could begin, please, 
by saying, in your position as a journalist and broadcaster, what was 
your general impression of decolonisation and the expanding 
Commonwealth at this particular time? 
 
BK: The main impression, of course, was that it was all happening remarkably 
quickly. When you think of it, 1960 was Africa’s year, and a very large number 
of African countries became independent in that year.  This applied to the 
former French colonies and of course to the former British colonies. I was, 
during that period, covering the decolonising conferences for the British 
territories, and it was really a period of very rapid change: so rapid, looking 
back on it, it’s much easier to put it in perspective, but at the time the one 
obvious thing about it was that everything seemed to be happening at once. 
Incidentally, this was not just in Africa, because for example there were 
discussions going on about the ill-fated West Indies Federation at exactly that 
period. 
 
SO: So what you’re describing then is the Commonwealth as an 
organisation, which of course had changed from 1949 from being a 
British Commonwealth to a Commonwealth of Nations, was itself going 
through dramatic expansion in the early 1960s because of this 
decolonisation in Africa and the West Indies? 
 
BK: Yes, I think that is clearer looking back from this position than it was at the 
time. The really significant thing that everyone was aware of at the time was 
that these countries - and they were of course mainly in Africa - were getting 
their independence. Since they all decided to become members of the 
Commonwealth, one of the implications clearly was a great and fairly rapid 
increase in the size of the Commonwealth. 
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SO: Did you attend Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conferences as well? 
Were you acting as a reporter and an observer of these events? 
 
BK: No, but I did have a little concern with the 1961 conference.  
 
SO: Where there was the controversial discussion of South African 
membership. 
 
BK: Yes, I wasn’t actually covering the conference but I did attend a press 
conference at a hotel in London at which Mr Verwoerd announced the 
decision of South Africa to leave the Commonwealth. The reason for his 
announcement of course was that it was quite clear by this stage that the 
other members of the Commonwealth were not prepared to let South Africa 
stay in. 
 
SO: Do you remember the tone of this press conference? Was it short, was it 
an acrimonious one? 
 
BK: It was short, it was slightly embittered, and I suppose it came as a great 
shock to most of us journalists who sat in, because although obviously we 
were aware that relations between South Africa and the rest of Africa and the 
rest of the world were pretty bad, I don’t think any of us would have predicted 
that on that day, without any notice, South Africa would announce its 
departure from the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: So was there something of a buzz round the room when he made that 
announcement? 
 
BK: Yes, there certainly was, yes. Incidentally, many years later in 1994, I had the 
pleasure of attending the service at Westminster Abbey at which South Africa 
was welcomed back into the Commonwealth. So there’s a certain kind of 
symmetry about that, from my point of view. 
 
SO: Bill, thereafter, did you follow the issue of racial change in South Africa 
particularly closely from both a professional and a personal interest 
point of view? 
 
BK: Well, I did, not so much from a professional point of view in that I didn’t 
actually go to South Africa until a good bit later, but I did follow it because it 
was of course relevant to what was happening in the Central African 
Federation - the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland; it was particularly 
relevant to what was happening in what was then Southern Rhodesia, 
because of course Southern Rhodesia was, by flavour, much more – they 
never had apartheid but they were much more like South Africa than they 
were about their two fellow members of the Federation, Northern Rhodesia 
now Zambia, and Nyasaland now Malawi.   
 
SO: From your journalistic standpoint, do you feel South Africa’s departure 
from the Commonwealth in 61 made the Commonwealth a more 
attractive club to join for the newly emerging independent states? 
 
BK: Yes, I think I’d go further than that. I think that probably most of them simply 
would not have wanted to join a Commonwealth in which apartheid South 
Africa was a member. 
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SO: So you don’t remember any particular African strength of feeling on this 
- for instance the Ghanaian view or Nigerian view on South African 
membership? Did you pick any reverberations about this question of 
South African departure? 
 
BK: Well, as I say, I think the main reverberation was that they saw it as inevitable 
because a modern Commonwealth couldn’t contain the apartheid government 
of South Africa. 
 
SO: Subsequent Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conferences in London in 
63, 64 and 65 were devoted not exclusively but primarily to the Southern 
Rhodesian question: did you cover these meetings as part of your 
responsibilities at The Times? 
 
BK: Well, only indirectly, because I was covering in 1963 it must have been the 
discussions on the future of the three central African territories.  There was a 
conference going on in London with Iain Macleod who was then the Colonial 
Secretary running it really on the future of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 
There was at the same time a conference going on in Rhodesia in Salisbury, 
as it then was, with Duncan Sandys who was the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations, running that. The problem was what they were 
trying to achieve obviously was really two things: i) independence for the 
member territories, and ii) a peaceful breakup of a federation which by that 
time it had become quite clear it simply couldn’t work. One of the problems 
was that the attitudes of the two ministers concerned, Iain Macleod and 
Duncan Sandys were very different. They didn’t get on with each other, so 
you had a conflict of principles between Southern Rhodesia and the two 
northern territories, and you had a conflict of personalities between the two 
senior ministers concerned. 
 
SO: Did this affect the officials’ relationship between the Colonial Office and 
the CRO? 
 
BK: I think it must have done. I think CRO had had for a long time a rather 
reactionary staff, but by this stage that had changed and they had crept into 
the modern world; so I think it was much more personal but of course it did 
inevitably affect how the negotiations were handled. 
 
SO: I know that you interviewed Iain Macleod for the Oxford Colonial 
Records Project and much of this interview was devoted to covering his 
time as Colonial Secretary between 1959 and 1961. Do you recall what 
Macleod felt about the Commonwealth as an institution, as a club? 
 
BK: Yes, I mean Macleod had a very clear that, well, two things really, that it 
wasn’t tenable or right to continue a colonial regime, Britain as an empire. He 
was quite clear about that. He was also quite clear that it made eminent 
sense for the British colonial territories of Africa to remain connected with 
each other or with the other members of the Commonwealth; so he was very 
positive about that. He was also quite clear about his feelings for his fellow 
government minister – when I did the interview with him for the Oxford 
Colonial Records Project after he’d left office – this was after the government 
had been defeated, and I had left The Times. I went to discuss with him 
details of where we were going to do it and I said as a matter of interest, “Why 
did you ask particularly for me to be your interviewer?” and he said, “Well, I’ve 
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just read your book on decolonisation  [W Kirkman, British Decolonisation 
(1967)] and I liked it. So I said to him, ‘Well, of course I’m delighted to hear 
you’ve read the book, but as you have read it I sometimes think I was a bit 
unfair on Duncan Sandys. And without a moment’s hesitation, Macleod said, 
“You want to conquer any feelings of that sort!”  [Laughter]   
 
SO: And I’m thinking you didn’t keep a straight face at that particular 
moment! 
 
BK: I didn’t! 
 
SO: Did you also interview Harold Macmillan? 
 
BK: No, I didn’t. 
 
SO: I know that he had a particular view of the Commonwealth as a magnet 
for newly independent African states in the Cold War, that this way they 
would resist the siren call of the Soviet Bloc and particular versions of 
socialism and development. I wondered if Macleod agreed with that 
particular view? 
 
BK: I don’t think he did. I think probably things were changing fairly rapidly 
because there was a tendency for the Commonwealth to be seen as the kind 
of way of keeping people together. One has to remember that at the same 
time the EEC, as it was then called, was rapidly developing. So I think it was 
inevitable that from a British point of view, relations with the EC, with later the 
EU, were inevitably going to play an important part. Of course, in parenthesis, 
one might say that looking at it from today’s point of view, one wonders how 
long that will continue, but that’s another story! And the Commonwealth 
remained relevant but it didn’t remain as relevant as it had done when it was 
a British empire. 
 
SO: How important, looking back, do you feel was the landscape of the Cold 
War at this time in the dramatic expansion of the Commonwealth?  I’m 
very struck by historians who write about the Commonwealth that they 
tend to think of the British Empire and the Commonwealth in isolation 
from what was after all the broader ideological international community, 
the battle between right and left or systems of Soviet-led socialism and 
liberal democratic capitalism? 
 
BK: Well, I think it certainly was significant.  For example, one of the reasons why 
some British ministers, some British politicians, and I think Margaret Thatcher 
would be among them, felt far more positively towards South Africa than 
many others did was because they were concerned with the fact that South 
Africa, as they saw it, was a bulwark against the creeping influx of 
communism.  Now of course, the purists would say – and I would count 
myself among them – that you don’t do yourself much help by allying yourself 
to a bunch of racist reactionaries when you’re trying to keep out another 
group of extremists! Because I think there was a strong feeling that that was 
the case. 
 
SO: In your coverage of decolonisation, between 1960 to 1964, you must 
have interviewed a considerable number of emerging African 
politicians.  You also of course covered the Kenyan elections in 1963.  
You have made reference to the breakup of the Central African 
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Federation - did you interview Kenneth Kaunda, or did you interview Dr 
Hastings Banda of Nyasaland? 
 
BK: I certainly interviewed Kenneth Kaunda on a number of occasions and we 
had a pretty good working relationship. I interviewed him – you must 
remember at this time of course he was not Prime Minister of Northern 
Rhodesia, he was a minister and he was very obviously about to take over, 
but I did have discussions with him about where Northern Rhodesia, Zambia, 
would be going. He was quite clear that he wanted it to remain in the 
Commonwealth.  He was quite clear of course that he wanted fundamental 
change in Southern Rhodesia.  He was also clear that he was keen to have 
the benefits that membership of the Commonwealth would bring.  To take one 
specific example, when they were discussing the railway from the coast to... 
well, I’ll use the modern name, Zambia, you may remember that it was built 
by the Chinese.  I had a discussion with him about this and he said he would 
have greatly preferred it to be built by the British because that would have 
kept the Commonwealth thing, but he had to have the railway, and the British 
weren’t interested. 
 
SO: So there was no British political interest and there was certainly no 
financial support for that particular project? 
 
BK: No, no. 
 
SO: Kenneth Kaunda, who of course plays such a significant part as a 
leading president of the Front Line States towards the final settlement of 
the Rhodesia problem from 65 to 79, was also a stalwart and outspoken 
critic of apartheid South Africa.  You’ve made mention of his particular 
commitment to the Commonwealth. What was he like as a politician?    
 
BK: Well, as a politician I think he was a pretty charismatic figure. He was an 
excellent orator for example, and a very hard worker.  I think he stayed in 
office slightly too long, he would have done better to stand down slightly 
earlier than he did, but significantly, he’s still living in Zambia, and he still has 
staff, so he has a kind of status there. He did play an absolutely crucial role in 
the period when the future of South Africa’s relations with the rest of Africa 
were at a period of very great and dramatic change. 
 
SO: Did you stay in touch with him?  You said that you had first interviewed 
him when he was a nationalistic leader before Zambian independence. 
 
BK: I stayed in touch with him a bit. In fact the last time I actually saw him was in 
2005 in this college when I arranged a meal for him and a number of other 
people who were taking part in the conference to mark the 40th anniversary of 
UDI, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence.  He took part in that 
conference as indeed did you. I had a dinner party for him here. 
 
SO: I’m just wondering whether you had been in any way in touch with him 
when he did step down in 1991, and whether you were aware of the 
Commonwealth Secretary General providing, should we say, quiet 
advice in whether it was appropriate for him to move to multiparty 
democracy in Zambia rather than trying to keep one party rule under his 
leadership? 
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BK: I don’t know about that, it wouldn’t surprise me, and I said earlier I think he 
would have been wise to have stepped down a bit earlier, and the way things 
have developed subsequently in Zambia bears that out.  He was of course 
also very close to Julius Nyerere, the President of Tanzania; they were very 
good friends. 
 
SO: Even though they might have intense political disagreements? 
 
BK: Yes.  I mean one rather significant thing was that when, you may remember 
that soon after he stood down, and he stood down voluntarily, Kenneth 
Kaunda was locked up by his immediate successor, and he told me this story 
himself.  Julius Nyerere, who was still in office, came to visit him in Zambia, 
insisted on visiting him in jail and said ‘I shall remain until he’s released’. 
 
SO: I see: solidarity of African leadership. 
 
BK: Yes. And of course he was released. 
 
SO: In the politics of Rhodesian UDI, of course, Kenneth Kaunda was a very 
firm supporter of Joshua Nkomo and ZAPU, whose fighters and 
refugees were based in Zambia, whereas Nyerere tended to support 
ZANU and its ultimate leadership under Robert Mugabe from 1976. That 
must have caused a strain to their friendship if there were intense 
political differences? 
 
BK: Well, it may well have done, I was certainly not aware of that.  They did 
remain pretty close on a personal level. 
 
SO: What were your views, your analysis of Julius Nyerere as a leader of a 
leading Commonwealth country in Southern Africa? 
 
BK: Well, I have the warmest regard for Julius Nyerere because he was a person 
of real vision.  On a personal level he stood down from power very voluntarily; 
he worked hard to support his successor and to continue to represent his 
country, he was a very firm believer in what one would call Commonwealth 
values.  He had a big advantage I think and that is Tanzania doesn’t have the 
same kind of racial tensions that other countries, Kenya for example, has. 
There’s a much more united racial ethic setup in Tanzania then there is, was 
and is, in Kenya. 
 
SO: I’d say that is the direct product of Nyerere’s deliberate ‘nation-state 
building’ from the independence of Tanzania. 
 
BK: I think that’s right, but it was helped of course by the fact that what you don’t 
have in Tanzania is what you do have in Kenya - for example, two major 
powerful tribes, the Kikuyu and the Luo. In Zimbabwe there is the same kind 
of situation. 
 
SO: Between the Shona and Ndebele speaking communities? 
 
BK: Yes. 
 
SO: Bill, obviously having covered the Kenyan elections of 63, you had a 
particularly good view of the dynamics of Kenyan politics and political 
leaders, Jomo Kenyatta, Oginga Odinga and also Tom Mboya, leader of 
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the Trade Union Movement.  Could you comment on those particular 
personalities who were of importance in the Commonwealth after 
Kenyan independence? 
 
BK: Yes, well, let me start with Kenyatta.  I think the really significant thing about 
Kenyatta is that he was a person of wide knowledge, wide experience, he had 
after all lived in the UK during part of the war.  He was, in a sense, I think, 
calumnified over... the problems, pre-independence problems with Kikuyu.  
But he was a man, in my experience, of very considerable vision and very 
considerable calmness as a leader.  I remember, for example, attending a 
press conference which he gave in the basement of a London hotel fairly 
soon after he’d been released and before the election, but it was quite clear 
that he was going to stand.  And at this press conference, suddenly 
somebody threw something at him.  Well, as you can imagine, there was a 
horror stricken silence because everyone thought it was a bomb.  The police 
leapt forward and arrested the person who’d thrown it and there was a sort of 
horror stricken silence. Kenyatta remained absolutely calm throughout. The 
representative of KANU at that time in London, Joe Murumbi (who became 
Vice-President for a time afterwards), looked across the room at me and said, 
“Did you see what that was wrapped in?”  And he said, looking at me, 
“Actually, it was a copy of The Times.”  What it contained was the carcass of 
a chicken. And he did that to lighten the moment.   
 
Kenyatta, I think, had a much greater vision than many people gave him 
credit for.  Oginga Odinga was notable particularly as a flamboyant character 
but he’s certainly not a trivial character at all.  It was quite interesting that he 
was a Luo of course and he had a key position in the government in spite of 
that fact. He was a remarkable orator incidentally: he represented Kenya at 
the conference in 1963, in Addis Ababa at which the Organisation of African 
Unity, as it then was, was being set up and he was invited to speak on behalf 
of the still non-independent states because Kenya was just on the verge of 
independence, and he gave a remarkable speech attacking imperialism 
ferociously. But he had to begin, “Your Imperial Majesty.”! 
 
SO: I’m particularly struck, as were British officials at the time, by the 
difference between African nationalist and independence leaders 
making really quite robust, critical, derogatory remarks in public in 
contrast to the much more pragmatic attitudes that they would express 
in private.   
 
BK: Yes, Oginga Odinga pulled no punches.  As a matter of fact, I travelled back 
on the plane with him to Nairobi and I congratulated him on his speech and 
he said, “I hope you’ve covered it in full?” and I said ‘Well, I haven’t actually, 
I’ve left that to Reuters but I shall do a piece and it’s easier to do it from 
Kenya because it’s cheaper because the cost of cable’ – it was cables then – 
‘from the Commonwealth countries is a good deal cheaper than from non-
Commonwealth countries. So if you want your speeches covered, you’ll have 
to remain in the Commonwealth.’  “We will, my dear,” he said, “we will.”  
 
Tom Mboya was one of the brightest people I ever met among African 
politicians.  I knew him reasonably well and he had a real vision for his 
country and much wider than that, and of course he was assassinated. 
He was highly intelligent, very well educated, a real visionary, and he would 
have made a very good minister.  I knew him before his death but I didn’t 
cover his assassination, no.  
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SO: From your standpoint as a journalist in London reporting on Africa, 
what was the perception of the Commonwealth of the readership for 
which you were writing at the time? 
 
BK: Well, the readership of The Times had a fairly strong appreciation of it, but 
what I think was true - not just of Times readers but generally - was that what 
was not really fully appreciated was the nature of the change that was 
happening in the Commonwealth.  What was appreciated of course was the 
nature of changes that were happening in Africa and in the individual 
countries of Africa.  It’s very difficult to be sure about how people are thinking 
but what one has to remember is that at that time – I mean we’re talking 
about three or four years in the 1960s – a vast amount was going on; 
independence movements were coming up, two or three a day as it were, and 
that was where the focus was.  So I think people were very much aware of 
that but I don’t think there was a great deal of balanced reflection on where 
this was leading the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: Do you think at the time in the 1960s, there was an enduring perception 
in Britain of it being the ‘British’ Commonwealth?  Even though I accept 
it was not. 
 
BK: That wasn’t my perception, certainly from the people I was dealing with, 
because I think there had been a general acceptance of the philosophical 
point that it was going to be a much wider body than the former British 
Commonwealth had been.   There may have been among some people a 
feeling that it ought to remain the British Commonwealth but they were really, 
I think, a minority who were out of touch with the political realities of the day. 
 
SO: As you say, Bill, the political realities by 1966 was the Commonwealth 
had expanded to 22, and the emergence of the African countries and the 
Asian countries, who were forming a bloc at the United Nations, which 
appeared to be complicating things for Britain, for instance over 
Gibraltar, or particularly over Southern Rhodesia. 
 
There’s one particular African leader, the personality whom I should ask 
you about, and that is Milton Obote of Uganda. 
 
BK: I saw Milton Obote when he was first in power. I didn’t see him after his return 
to power.  He was of course in a slightly odd position because he was not a 
member of the Baganda, so he was a Prime Minister of a country, the main 
bit of which was Buganda, I mean in size and importance and influence. My 
impression of Obote, when I went to see him at the time, was that he had a 
very clear view that he wanted: Uganda to become independent which it did 
in 1962. I saw him just after that and he was quite clear that that involved 
remaining in the Commonwealth, I think he was perfectly happy with that, and 
he had and wanted to keep reasonably good relations with his immediate 
neighbours. 
 
SO: What did you think of him as a political personality? 
 
BK: Well, difficult to judge. I thought he was quite a reflective personality, he 
wasn’t a flamboyant leader but he was a reflective leader with whom one 
could have a quiet and reflective conversation. 
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SO: That was very evident that Britain welcomed his private comments on 
the whole question of sanctions towards Rhodesia after November 
which was that he recognised that Britain was in a compromised 
position. British officials were remarking that they very much welcome 
his pragmatic approach and realisation that it is complicated for Britain 
on this; thanks to Obote’s contribution, the discussion of Rhodesia at 
subsequent Prime Ministers’ Conferences was not falling down on racial 
grounds.  
 
BK: Yes, I think that’s right. There are various possible reasons why that may be 
the case. In his capacity as Prime Minister of Uganda, he had to take into 
account ethnic differences and produce some kind of unity within Uganda 
itself, between the Baganda, the Banyoro and the Toro. 
 
SO: While the acceleration towards independence was going on in Africa, 
you were also covering the breakup of the West Indies Federation? 
 
BK: Yes, I was covering that in the sense that there were various discussions 
going on in London. I didn’t actually go to the West Indies, but my own take 
on it, and I think I was not alone in this, was that it was a very good example 
of the obsession with federations that we had in Britain at that time. We 
should never have started the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, we 
should never have started the West Indies Federation because if you look at 
the map you will see that the distance between the members of it is very 
great. 
 
SO: There was also the Federation of Malaysia and Singapore. 
 
BK: Yes, precisely, so we were more kind of ‘More Federal Follies’ I had as a 
chapter in my book.  There were also power differences. I don’t mean power 
in the sense of people trying to run the thing but Jamaica and Trinidad were 
far more powerful economically, for example, than the smaller territories, and 
the Prime Minister of the Federation was the Premier of Barbados. Grantley 
Adams was a perfectly pleasant man but he was not frankly in the same 
league intellectually as either Norman Manley of Jamaica or the Trinidadian,  
Eric Williams. The Federation of the West Indies was a gathering of people 
whose formal leader, Grantley Adams, really wasn’t up to dealing on equal 
terms with the others. I think it’s probably worth repeating that I went to 
interview Eric Williams in London. It was a very good interview for The Times, 
and when we’d finished we were just chatting and he was quite clear that the 
West Indies Federation was doomed, and he said, referring to Grantley 
Adams, he said he’d dealt with good politicians and bad ones in his time but 
this was the first time he’d had to deal with a vacuum! Which was a very 
unkind comment, but you could see what he was getting at. 
 
SO: The process you were talking about, the unwinding of the West Indies 
Federation and the move towards independence, was also the time of 
the Cold War crisis in the Caribbean - with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 
62. So the expansion of the Commonwealth again was touching the 
Cold War. 
 
BK: Yes, my impression is that there was no wish on the part of the West Indies 
countries, the islands, to leave the Commonwealth. That wasn’t the issue. 
The question was whether they would join together in a federation. 
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SO: What was your view of Eric Williams and Norman Manley as politicians, 
their political styles, their particular focuses and approaches? 
 
BK: Yes, Norman Manley was a much warmer, outgoing personality, highly 
intelligent. Eric Williams was highly intelligent but he was more prickly and he 
had very little patience. He didn’t suffer fools gladly. I got on quite well with 
him but he probably didn’t think I was a complete idiot! [Laughter] 
 
SO: You’ve set the stage for accelerated decolonisation in Africa, in the 
West Indies and the changing of the Commonwealth and its 
configuration, expansion of its membership, did you take a view as a 
journalist, on the creation of the Commonwealth Secretariat in 1965? 
You said that you were welcomed as a guest at Marlborough House 
when it was established. 
 
BK: I had left The Times by then, but I was still of course interested. Yes, I felt that 
it was not before time. For traditional reasons the Commonwealth had really 
been administered from Britain, and I mean from the British government, and 
that clearly made little sense if you were going to take seriously the fact that it 
was a Commonwealth of Nations. So it was important to have a separate – 
and a clearly separate secretariat. I don’t think there was a problem about 
having it in Britain because there were all kinds of historic reasons but also 
practical reasons, such as communications. So I think that was a fairly 
significant move. The first couple of Secretaries General were personalities in 
their own right and were able to deal with member governments, including the 
British government, which was very important.  My own feeling is that by this 
time, however, decolonisation had almost finished. Although there were still a 
few to come, most of the former British colonies had become independent 
and the process was well under way. I think there was a feeling in Britain, a 
sort of fatigue about it all. There’s never been to my mind a great enthusiasm 
for the idea of the Commonwealth in Britain. 
 
SO: Yet in contrast to the lack of enthusiasm within Britain for the 
Commonwealth, when the Secretariat was created it was led by two 
people of stature who became Secretaries General, Arnold Smith 
between 65 and 75, and then Sonny Ramphal 1975-1990 – combined 
with the quality of leaders of Commonwealth states in this time. You’ve 
made reference consistently to their intellectual abilities, to their 
political abilities, also the fact that many of them were educated in 
Britain. Looking back it seems that this is a particular flowering of 
charismatic African leadership, charismatic leadership in the Caribbean. 
 
BK: Well, I think all that is true and I think the Commonwealth was seen then as a 
remarkable and a very positive thing (outside Britain). I think the problem, as I 
see it, among a lot of the British was that they never quite bought into it in the 
same way that the former parts of the Empire did. In other words, for the 
African countries ‘we’re becoming independent and we can join this body the 
Commonwealth’. For the British, it was ‘we’re losing our colonies’. I think 
Macmillan’s idea was a perfectly valid one except that of course the whole 
situation had changed or was changing, and as I said earlier, British links with 
Europe were, for obvious geographical and economic reasons, becoming 
ever more important. 
 
SO: And it becomes of course increasingly relevant when Britain formally 
joined the European Economic Community under Edward Heath in 1973. 
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BK: Yes, that’s right. Edward Heath was passionate as you know about that and 
Edward Heath I don’t think had much interest in the Commonwealth. Of 
course in a way you can understand if you’re taking the country into a major 
new membership, that’s what you’re focusing on, but I got the feeling that 
Heath was focused to the point almost of monomania on that. There were 
some British politicians, there’ve been more recently I think, who have got a 
sense of what the Commonwealth is worth, but at the time I think it was seen 
almost as a kind of relic of Empire. 
 
SO: You point to the fact that these newly independent African leaders in the 
60s and the 70s possessed a particular calibre of leadership – 
combining charismatic leadership and the authority of office. But this 
was also within their own countries, elite politics to an extraordinary 
degree. Kenneth Kaunda is described as a ‘one bullet person’ - take out 
Kaunda and then what would happen in Zambian politics? 
 
The practice of international politics has changed over the life of the 
Commonwealth: in the earlier period it lent itself to the informal 
discussions at Commonwealth heads of government meeting within a 
newly extended family but it still was focused at the top, whereas now 
international politics has changed dramatically. International 
organisations have multiplied, the politics within these countries have 
become more complex themselves. 
 
BK: Yes, I think that’s right. I’m no expert on international organisations but just 
observing what has been happening in the last two or three years, the UN’s 
effectiveness has been questionable, to put it kindly, the European Union’s 
effectiveness is under question – Bosnia in the 90s and now the economic 
situation. And I think my own take on this is that while this is happening, one 
of the arguments against the Commonwealth from people who were not very 
enthusiastic was that it had no power. 
 
SO: But it’s a soft power organisation. 
 
BK: Well, precisely, but a lot of people didn’t find that attractive. If you now look at 
the organisations which are supposed to have power like the UN and the 
European Union and you see the severe limitations to their power, there 
becomes more to be said, in my view, for an organisation which does not 
pretend to be and never has pretended to be a centre of political power in the 
world but a centre of rational discussion and exchange of ideas. 
  
SO: It’s also the increasing complexity of the Commonwealth with the 
expansion of non-state diplomatic actors within it, such as its non-
governmental civil society organisations. There is also the aspect of the 
expansion of its members – now it includes non-originally Anglophone 
countries, Mozambique, Cameroon and Rwanda. The Commonwealth 
has evolved into a multi-centred, multi-ethnic association. It’s not a 
defence organisation, it’s not an economic organisation, but its 
members do feature in leading economic organisations. 
 
BK: Yes, it is represented not as the Commonwealth necessarily, it’s been 
represented in a very wide variety of types of organisation, I mean 
geographically and of course in size: India and very small countries, for 
example. 
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SO: As a longstanding commentator of individual countries but also as an 
observer of the Commonwealth as a whole, how much importance do 
you attach to the value of Queen Elizabeth II as its leader: to the 
Commonwealth’s continuing identity, in the continual value of being 
part of this club? 
 
BK: Very difficult to say I think because the one very obvious thing is that she has 
been a dedicated supporter of, a proponent of the Commonwealth and has 
worked tirelessly in its support. I think that has obviously been very important. 
I think it’s been particularly important that she’s been accepted in that role by 
the majority of countries in the Commonwealth which of course are not 
monarchies. She was there from the beginning and has been a very clear, 
dedicated supporter. I don’t think any organisation is likely to depend only on 
one person. One of the questions people tend to ask is will it continue when 
the Queen dies. Well, of course I don’t know the answer to that but I see no 
reason why it shouldn’t. 
 
SO: Indeed, but she does provide the most extraordinarily inexpensive 
leadership of the Commonwealth. 
 
BK: Exactly. Yes. And one of her strengths obviously is that she’s not a political 
figure. She’s Queen of individual Commonwealth countries but she’s Head of 
the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: Why do you think the Commonwealth has survived and how has it 
survived, just to conclude? 
 
BK: I think it’s survived because it brings great benefits in the way that you’ve just 
described as a soft power organisation and brings together and has brought 
together countries of very widely varied strengths, sizes, histories. It’s an 
organisation which has a kind of unity of purpose without forcing people into a 
unity of political or economic... direction. There is a sanction of course of 
suspension of membership. Membership has been withdrawn from a number 
of countries... I think it is the fact that it is not a great centre of power oddly 
enough is one of its strengths. I’ve always been a great believer in the 
Commonwealth and I still am. I think in a way the arguments for it are much 
more obvious now than they were 20 years ago, for all those reasons. 
 
SO: A beautiful oxymoron, because it doesn’t have formal bonds that 
provides its energy and focus, and because it has the ability to 
consistently to reinvent itself? 
 
BK: Yes. Well, it has, and of course you wouldn’t have invented it. 
 
SO: No, indeed, indeed!  Well, Bill, as someone who I should say was almost 
‘present at the creation’ of the Commonwealth in the 1960s, thank you 
very much indeed. 
 
[END OF AUDIO FILE] 
